(B.A., Philosophy, Politics, & Economics, University of Oxford, 2017; MPhil, Philosophy, University of St Andrews, 2020). I spend much of my time trying to use formal tools to tackle problems in areas of ethics such as population ethics, infinite ethics, the ethics of war, animal ethics, effective altruism, equality, and desert.
Previously I worked on the philosophy of logic. My MPhil thesis addressed the question of how many correct logics there are, and defended logical monism from the twin threats of logical nihilism and logical pluralism. If you’re intrigued—or looking for something to send you to sleep—you can check out the papers below, both of which started life as chapters in my thesis.
Outside of philosophy, I enjoy stand-up comedy, hiking, and being in close proximity to various non-human animals.
Here is a copy of my CV.
Evershed, J. W. (2021). Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 121(3), 411–424. DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoab005
This paper argues that various forms of logical pluralism are inconsistent with the normativity of logic as they entail logically contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason.
Evershed, J. W. (2021). Another Way Logic Might Be Normative. Synthese, 199(3), 5861-5881. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03049-z
This paper argues that, in addition to logic (potentially) being normative for the combinations of beliefs that we may have, it is also normative for the methods by which we may form our beliefs.