I occupy myself these days mainly with paradoxes—particularly the especially nasty kind that threatens classical logic (e.g. the Liar, Curry’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox). I’m interested both in first-order questions, like for example how to solve them, as well as some more abstract questions they engender, like how it could be so much as possible to entertain reasons for revising the logic that you accept. (What, if not the logic you accept, would you use to reason with?)

On the first-order questions, I’m working on formulating paradoxes of self-reference directly at the level of intentional attitudes, instead of via sentential reference as is standardly done. All sorts of interesting puzzles arise about propositional reference, propositional quantification, and potentially indeterminate attitudes. Perhaps this has interesting results for folk psychology and the metaphysics of propositions; perhaps it will prove to be an idle curiosity. Ask a future part of my spacetime worm for the answer, or, for the impatient, its present part for speculations.