I received my B.A. from Kalamazoo College (2006), an M.A. from Georgia State University (2010), studied abroad at the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science, and worked at the Moral Cognition Lab (see also) at Harvard. I currently work in the Concepts and Cognition Lab at Berkeley.
My dissertation investigates what dual-processing theories in psychology (e.g., on implicit biases) mean for autonomy, free will, and moral responsibility - for what they are, and whether it turns out that we have less of them than we thought.
Murray, D., & Buchak, L. In Preparation. “Risk and Motivation: When the Will is Required to Determine What To Do.”
Murray, D., & Lombrozo, T. Forthcoming. “The effect of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and moral responsibility.” Cognitive Science.
Murray, D. 2015. “Situationism, Going Mental, and Modal Akrasia.” Philosophical Studies 172: 711-736.
Murray, D. & Nahmias, E. 2014. “Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 434-467.
Murray, D., Sytsma, J., and Livengood, J. 2013. “God Knows (But does God Believe?)“ Philosophical Studies 166: 83-107.
Cushman, F.A., Murray, D., Gordon-McKeon, S., Wharton, S., and Greene, J.D. 2012. “Judgment before principle: Engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission.” Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience 7(8): 888-895.
Nahmias, E. & Murray, D. 2010. ”Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions,“ in J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, and K. Frankish (eds.) New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. 189-216.