Event Detail

Wed Nov 9, 2011
Dennes Room, 234 Moses Hall, 6:10–8 PM
Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science
Bernard Molyneux and Paul Teller (UC Davis)
A model for de se belief and action

We develop an approach to the problem of de se belief (What does the shopper with the leaky sugar bag have to learn to know that HE is the one making the mess?) We note that, although ultimately all action must involve some kind of de se element, the cases like that of the messy shopper really involve not only a special kind of belief but a kind of dual in a special kind of action. We then develop an approach to be found in Perry () – the spirit of our development arises from thinking how a robot might be designed to exhibit de se like behavior. The resulting model handles de se belief and its dual de se action together. This model is far too simple to have any claim to showing how the de se works for humans, but it shows, by illustration, that nothing mysteriously “subjective” need be involved and, helps, again by illustration, to understand the functionality involved in the de se.