Event Detail

Pre-read session on Alexander’s (and Lukas Lewerentz’s) paper ‘On Norms of Assertion and Common Ground’. Abstract:

In a recent paper, Yalcin argues that the common ground is governed by a norm according to which by default, a proposition is common ground just in case it is common knowledge. Yalcin also suggests that this norm of the common ground generates a corresponding default knowledge norm of assertion according to which by default, one should assert only what one knows. This paper sheds light on the underexplored idea of deriving the epistemic norms of assertion from norms governing the common ground. We argue that the prospects for this idea are poor. More specifically, we argue that Yalcin’s proposal for how to derive the default knowledge norm of assertion isn’t convincing, and we cast doubt on the general project of deriving epistemic norms of assertion from norms of the common ground.