Event Detail

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that space and time are the forms of our sensibility, our capacity to be affected by objects. As such, space and time make a difference to how we conceptualize objects. In this talk, I will argue that the overall difference they make is that we conceptualize objects as parts of a common world.

In the first part of the talk, I focus on a section of the Critique commonly referred to as the “Amphiboly,” where Kant criticizes Leibniz’s conception of an object and contrasts to it his own. The difference, I argue, is that Kant takes what I call a world-first view, whereas Leibniz takes what I call a substances-first view, and it is marked by the role space and time play for how we conceptualize objects.

In the second part of the talk, I discuss what is sometimes regarded as a peculiar interest of Kant, so-called incongruent counterparts. These are pairs of objects that are similar in shape and equal in size but which cannot be superimposed. An example is the pair of our left and right hands. I argue that Kant’s point with respect to these objects is that their difference is one that only arises insofar as three-dimensional space as a whole conditions our conceptualization of objects. Their difference thus speaks to the point that objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world.