Fri Apr 9, 2021
Marcus Rossberg (University of Connecticut)
An Inferentialist Redundancy Theory of Truth
https://berkeley.zoom.us/j/99271828753 Registration with Zoom is required for access. Password hint: Gödel’s first name (lowercase)
I present a “fully schematic”, proof-theoretic account of higher-order logic. The framework allows for the explicit definition of truth predicates for arbitrarily strong theories formulated in the framework. Accordingly, for any reasonable language, a truth predicate is explicitly definable with purely logical, proof-theoretic means. Enough “truth” should thus be available to the inferentialist to do the theoretical work that opponents claim is wanting. Furthermore, deflationists claim that the truth-predicate does not express a substantive property, but is only required to express generalizations (and such like). On the account presented here, truth-predicates are purely logical, and indeed eliminable since they are logically definable. Deflationism appears to collapse into a redundancy theory of truth.