Philosophy 290-6

It seems hard to doubt that we powers to alter the normative situation of ourselves and others — releasing others from obligations as with consent, undertaking obligations ourselves as with promises, or imposing obligations on others, as with authoritative commands. But what is involved in the exercise of these powers? Does it suffice, for example, to intend the relevant alteration or to communicate such an intention? What conditions must be met to exercise these powers? How informed must we be, for example, about the alteration? Are there limits on these powers? Are there things we cannot consent to, for example, or cannot promise? Do these powers bring about the relevant alterations directly, or by somehow changing the non-normative situation? What accounts for normative powers? Does it suffice that we have interests in possessing them? Do they depend, in one way or another, on social conventions? We will ask these questions with a specific focus on the case of consent.

Philosophers we will read may include Hume, Raz, Owens, Enoch, Tadros, Dougherty, Liberto, Munoz-Dardé, and Lewinsohn.