Philosophy 290-6

The overarching topic of this seminar is consent, of the sort that makes, or seems to make, what is otherwise impermissible — such as surgery or sex — permissible.

For one of us, the main focus is on questions of consent in intimate relations. Many approaches take a uniform approach to questions of consent across property, the regulation of interference with the body, and sexual relations. But the questions surrounding medical consent highlight different social structures from those that relate to intimate questions. Focusing on the latter, one might question whether acts of consent, or the normative significance of an attitude of consenting, are fundamental to our concerns here, rather than foregrounding consensual or cooperative activities.

For one of us, the main focus is on consent as an instance of a so-called “normative power.” It seems hard to doubt that we have powers to alter the normative situation of ourselves and others — releasing others from obligations as with consent, undertaking obligations ourselves as with promises, or imposing obligations on others, as with authoritative commands. But what is involved in the exercise of these powers? Does it suffice, for example, to intend the relevant alteration or to communicate such an intention? What conditions must be met to exercise these powers? How informed must we be, for example, about the alteration? Are there limits on these powers? Are there things we cannot consent to, for example, or cannot promise? Do these powers bring about the relevant alterations directly, or by somehow changing the non-normative situation? What accounts for normative powers? Does it suffice that we have interests in possessing them? Do they depend, in one way or another, on social conventions?

Philosophers we will read may include Hume, Raz, Owens, Enoch, Tadros, Dougherty, Liberto, Gardner, Munoz-Dardé, Bolinger, and Lewinsohn.