All Publications

Books

Past, Space and Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1994).

Reference and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002).

Berkeley’s Puzzle (with Quassim Cassam) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, August 2014)

Articles

  1. “Locke on Qualities”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy X (1980), 567-585. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.) John Locke, Theory of Knowledge (Essays on early modern philosophers v.8) (New York ; London : Garland Publishing, 1992), 279-297. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke”s Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1998), 69-85.

  2. “Knowledge and Understanding”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), 17-34. Reprinted in Jennifer Hornsby and Guy Longworth (eds.), Reading Philosophy of Language: Selected Texts With an Interactive Commentary (Oxford: Blackwell 2005).

  3. “Twin Earth Revisited”, Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) 67-89.

  4. “Reply to Bennett”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy XII (1982) 757-761.

  5. “Possession of Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXV (1984/85) 135-156.

  6. “Conceptual Structure”, in Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation (Oxford and New York: Blackwell 1986), 159-174.

  7. “Is Sense Transparent?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXVIII (1987/88) 273-92. Reprinted in translation in Maria Stoicheva-Pantaleeva (ed.), A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy (Sofia: Sofia University Press 1995).

  8. “The Reductionist View of the Self”, in David Charles and Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 381-419.

  9. “A Simple View of Colour”, in John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection (Oxford: OUP 1993), 257-268, with a reply by Michael Smith. Reprinted in Argumento 3 (1993), 45-56. Reprinted in Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color: vol. 1, The Philosophy of Color (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997), 177-190.

  10. “The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking”, in N. Eilan, R. McCarthy and M.W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation (Oxford: Blackwell 1993; reprinted by Oxford University Press, 1999), 65-95.

  11. “Objects and Objectivity”, in C. Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Proceedings of the British Academy, 83 (1994), 3-20, with replies by Bill Brewer and John O’Keefe. Reprinted in translation in Maria Stoicheva-Pantaleeva (ed.), A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy (Sofia: Sofia University Press 1995).

  12. “The Body Image and Self-Consciousness”, in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42.

  13. “Human vs. Animal Time”, in Julio Artieda and Maria A. Pastor (eds.), Time, Internal Clocks and Movement (Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science B.V. 1996), 115-126.

  14. “Molyneux’s Question”, in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.

  15. “Shape Properties, Experience of Shape and Shape Concepts”, in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 351-363.

  16. “Sense, Reference and Selective Attention”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.

  17. “The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory”, European Journal of Philosophy 5 (1997), 105-118.

  18. “The Realism of Memory”, in Richard G. Heck Jnr. (ed.), Language, Thought and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 157-181.

  19. “Attention and Frames of Reference in Spatial Reasoning”, Mind and Language 12 (1997), 265-277.

  20. “Joint Attention and the First Person”, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind: Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Supplement 43 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 123-136.

  21. “Le Modèle de la Schizophrénie de Christopher Frith”, in Henri Grivois and Joëlle Proust (eds.), Subjectivité et Conscience D”Agir: Approches Cognitive et Clinique de la Psychose (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1998), 99-113.

  22. “Sense and Consciousness”, in Peter Sullivan and Johannes Brandl (eds.), New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Grazer Philosophische Studien, 55 (1998)), 195-211.

  23. “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process”, The Monist 82 (1999), 609-625.

  24. “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term”, Philosophical Topics 26 (1999), 89-104.

  25. “Wittgenstein on Attention”, Philosophical Topics, 28 (2000), 35-48.

  26. “Memory Demonstratives”, in Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 169-186.

  27. “Rationality, Meaning and the Analysis of Delusion”, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2001), 89-100.

  28. “Berkeley’s Puzzle”, in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O’Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 127-143.

  29. “Joint Attention and Simulation”, in Jerome Dokic and Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2002), 241-253, with a reply by Elisabeth Pacherie.

  30. “The Ownership of Thoughts”, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (2002), 35-39.

  31. “Philosophy of Mind”, in Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today (Oxford: OUP 2003), 131-146.

  32. “The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation”, in Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 150-164.

  33. “Reference as Attention”, Philosophical Studies 120 (2004), 265-276, with a reply by Sean Kelly.

  34. “What Is It To Know What ‘I’ Refers To?”, The Monist 87 (2004), 206-218.

  35. “The First Person, Embodiment, and the Certainty that One Exists”, The Monist 87 (2004), 475-488.

  36. “Joint Attention and Common Knowledge”. In Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 287-297.

  37. “Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux’s Question”, in José Bermudez (ed.), Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 195-219.

  38. “Molyneux’s Question and Cognitive Impenetrability”, in Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints (New York: Nova Science 2005), 129-139.

  39. “Transparency vs. Revelation in Color Perception”, Philosophical Topics (2005), 105-115.

  40. “Manipulating Colours: Pounding an Almond”, in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O'Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 31-48.

  41. “Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Austen Clark”, Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), 221-237.

  42. “What is the Role of Location in the Sense of a Visual Demonstrative? Reply to Mohan Matthen”, Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), 239-254.

  43. “Sortals and the Binding Problem”, in Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), 203-218.

  44. “Ordinary Thinking About Time”, in Friedrich Stadler and Michael Stoeltzner (eds.), Time and History: Proceedings of the 28th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2005 (Frankfurt: ontos verlag, 2006).

  45. “An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology”, in Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 58-66.

  46. “If Truth is Dethroned, What Role is Left For It?”, in Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (eds.), Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 2007), 281-300.

  47. “The Metaphysics of Perception”, in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), The Metaphysics of Epistemology: Philosophical Issues 17 (Blackwell, 2007), 1-15.

  48. “What’s the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects?”, Mind and Language 28 (2007), 548-562.

  49. “Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism”, Symposium on Alva Noë, Action in Perception, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008), 666-673.

  50. “Causation in Psychiatry”, in Kenneth Kendler and Josef Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 196-216, with a Comment by James Woodward.

  51. “Comment on Woodward: Psychological Causation Without Physical Causation”, in Kenneth Kendler and Josef Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 184-195.

  52. “Interventionism, Control Variables and Causation in the Qualitative World”, Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 424-443.

  53. “Consciousness and Reference”, in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 648-662.

  54. “What Does Rationality Have To Do With Psychological Causation? Propositional Attitudes as Control Variables and as Mechanisms”, in Matthew R. Broome and Lisa Bortolotti (eds) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137-149.

  55. (With Kenneth S. Kendler) “Interventionist Causal Models in Psychiatry: Repositioning the Mind-Body Problem”, Psychological Medicine 39 (2009), 881-887.

  56. “The Self”, in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal and Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (New York, Routledge, 2009), 569-577.

  57. “Molyneux’s Question”, in Timothy Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 449-450.

  58. “Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam’s The Possibility of Knowledge” Analysis 69 (2009), 309-317.

  59. “Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience and the Proximality Principle”, in Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 193-212.

  60. “Control Variables and Mental Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 110 (2010), 15-30.

  61. “Independence of Variables in Mental Causation”. In Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Issues 20, 2010, 64-79.

  62. “Consciousness and Language”, entry for Patrick Colm Hogan (ed.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 210-213.

  63. “Personal Identity”, in Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 337-349.

  64. “Relational vs. Kantian Responses to Berkeley’s Puzzle”, in Naomi Eilan, Hemdat Lerman and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Perception, Objectivity and Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 35-50.

  65. “Intelligible Causation”, in Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 232-248.

  66. “Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness”. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies and Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 323-341.

  67. “Why Do Language Use and Tool Use Both Count as Manifestations of Intelligence?”. In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl and Stephen Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 169-182.

  68. “An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention”. In Axel Seeman (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Social Neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 415-430.

  69. “Wittgenstein on the Role of Perception in an Understanding of Language”, in Daniel Guevara and Jonathan Ellis (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 61-71.

  70. “Does Perception Do Any Work In an Understanding of the First Person?”. In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), The Self and Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 102-119.

  71. “Is Spatial Awareness Required for Object Perception?”. In Roxana Baiasu, Adrian Moore and Graham Bird (eds.), Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics Today (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

  72. “On the Thesis that ‘I’ is Not a Referring Term”. In Simon Prosser and François Recanti (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-21.

  73. “Perceiving the Intended Model”. In Peter Machamer and Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 96-122.

  74. “A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle”, Harvard Review of Philosophy, 18 (2012).

  75. “Lichtenberg and the Cogito”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2012), 361-378.

  76. “Causation and Mechanisms in Psychiatry”, in Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini and Tim Thornton (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 935-949.

  77. (With Kenneth S. Kendler) “Expanding the Domain of the Understandable in Psychiatric Illness: An Updating of the Jasperian Framework of Explanation and Understanding”. Psychological Medicine 44 (2014), 1-9.

  78. “Why Is Perceptual Attention Philosophically Interesting?”, in Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).

Reviews and Discussions

  1. Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content, Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986) 278-291.

  2. Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke, Thoughts, Mind XCVIII (1989) 135-143.

  3. Review of Gareth Evans, Collected Papers, Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989) 156-163.

  4. Précis of Past Space and Self, and Replies to comments by José Bermudez, Quassim Cassam and Timothy Williamson, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), 633-634 and 655-670.

  5. “Voices in the Head”, review of G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham, When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts, Times Literary Supplement no. 5097, December 8th 2000, p. 13.

  6. Précis of Reference and Consciousness, and Replies to Neil Manson and Georges Rey, Philosophical Studies 126 (2005), 103-114, 145-153, 155-162.

  7. ‘Review Essay on Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity’, Journal of Philosophy, CVIII (2011), 269-285

  8. “Inductions about Attention and Consciousness: Comments on Carolyn Suchy-Dicey, ‘Inductive Scepticism and the Methodological Argument’”. Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (2012) 610–612.

  9. ‘George Berkeley’s Puzzle’, in David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton (eds.), Philosophy Bites Back (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).

  10. “Susanna Siegel’s The Contents of Visual Experience”, Philosophical Studies 163 (2013), 819-826.

Updated on 2014-03-13 09:45:56 -0700 by John Campbell