All Publications
Books
Past, Space and Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1994).
Reference and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002).
Articles
"Locke on Qualities", Canadian Journal of Philosophy X (1980), 567-585. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.) John Locke, Theory of Knowledge (Essays on early modern philosophers v.8) (New York ; London : Garland Publishing, 1992), 279-297. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke"s Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1998), 69-85.
"Knowledge and Understanding", Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), 17-34. Reprinted in Jennifer Hornsby and Guy Longworth (eds.), Reading Philosophy of Language: Selected Texts With an Interactive Commentary (Oxford: Blackwell 2005).
"Twin Earth Revisited", Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) 67-89.
"Reply to Bennett", Canadian Journal of Philosophy XII (1982) 757-761.
"Possession of Concepts", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXV (1984/85) 135-156.
"Conceptual Structure", in Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation (Oxford and New York: Blackwell 1986), 159-174.
"Is Sense Transparent?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXVIII (1987/88) 273-92. Reprinted in translation in Maria Stoicheva-Pantaleeva (ed.), A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy (Sofia: Sofia University Press 1995). (This is an electronic version of an article published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal's website at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0066-7374 or www.blackwell-synergy.com.)
"The Reductionist View of the Self", in David Charles and Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 381-419.
"A Simple View of Colour", in John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection (Oxford: OUP 1993), 257-268, with a reply by Michael Smith. Reprinted in Argumento 3 (1993), 45-56. Reprinted in Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color: vol. 1, The Philosophy of Color (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997), 177-190. (By permission of Oxford University Presss www.oup.com.)
"The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking", in N. Eilan, R. McCarthy and M.W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation (Oxford: Blackwell 1993; reprinted by Oxford University Press, 1999), 65-95.
"Objects and Objectivity", in C. Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Proceedings of the British Academy, 83 (1994), 3-20, with replies by Bill Brewer and John O'Keefe. Reprinted in translation in Maria Stoicheva-Pantaleeva (ed.), A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy (Sofia: Sofia University Press 1995).
"The Body Image and Self-Consciousness", in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42.
"Human vs. Animal Time", in Julio Artieda and Maria A. Pastor (eds.), Time, Internal Clocks and Movement (Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science B.V. 1996), 115-126.
"Molyneux's Question", in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
"Shape Properties, Experience of Shape and Shape Concepts", in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 351-363.
"Sense, Reference and Selective Attention", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
"The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory", European Journal of Philosophy 5 (1997), 105-118. (By permission of Oxford University Press www.oup.com)
"The Realism of Memory", in Richard G. Heck Jnr. (ed.), Language, Thought and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 157-181.
"Attention and Frames of Reference in Spatial Reasoning", Mind and Language 12 (1997), 265-277.
"Joint Attention and the First Person", in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind: Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Supplement 43 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 123-136.
"Le Modèle de la Schizophrénie de Christopher Frith", in Henri Grivois and Joëlle Proust (eds.), Subjectivité et Conscience D'Agir: Approches Cognitive et Clinique de la Psychose (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1998), 99-113.
"Sense and Consciousness", in Peter Sullivan and Johannes Brandl (eds.), New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Grazer Philosophische Studien, 55 (1998)), 195-211.
"Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process", The Monist 82 (1999), 609-625. (Copyright © 1999, THE MONIST: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry. Peru, Illinois 61354. BBy permission.)
"Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term", Philosophical Topics 26 (1999), 89-104.
"Wittgenstein on Attention", Philosophical Topics, 28 (2000), 35-48.
"Memory Demonstratives", in Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 169-186.
"Rationality, Meaning and the Analysis of Delusion", Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2001), 89-100. (Used with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press, from Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2001), 89-100; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.)
"Berkeley's Puzzle", in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O'Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 127-143. (By permission of Oxford University Press www.oup.com)
"Joint Attention and Simulation", in Jerome Dokic and Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2002), 241-253, with a reply by Elisabeth Pacherie.
"The Ownership of Thoughts", Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (2002), 35-39.
"Philosophy of Mind", in Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today (Oxford: OUP 2003), 131-146. (By permission of Oxford University Press www.oup.com)
"The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation", in Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 150-164.
"Reference as Attention", Philosophical Studies 120 (2004), 265-276, with a reply by Sean Kelly.
"What Is It to Know What 'I' Refers To?", The Monist 87 (2004), 206-218. (Copyright © 2004, THE MONIST: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry. Peru, Illinois 61354. By permission.)
"The First Person, Embodiment, and the Certainty that One Exists", The Monist 87 (2004), 475-488. (Copyright © 2004, THE MONIST: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry. Peru, Illinois 61354. By permission.)
"Joint Attention and Common Knowledge". In Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 287-297.
"Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question". In José Bermudez (ed.), Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 195-219. draft
"Molyneux's Question and Cognitive Impenetrability", in Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints (New York: Nova Science 2005), 129-139.
"Manipulating Colours: Pounding an Almond", in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O'Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (New York: Oxford University Press 2006).
"Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Austen Clark", Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), 221-237. "What is the Role of Location in the Sense of a Visual Demonstrative? Reply to Mohan Matthen", Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), 239-254.
"An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology", in Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press). pdf
"If Truth is Dethroned, What Role is Left For It?", in Randall E. Auxier (ed.), Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, in press). pdf
"Ordinary Thinking About Time", in Friedrich Stadler and Michael Stoeltzner (eds.), Proceedings of the Wittgenstein Symposium 2005 on Time and History (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, in press). pdf
"Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism", Symposium on Alva Noë, Action in Perception, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (in press). pdf
"Sortals and the Binding Problem", in Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality (Oxford: OUP, in press).
"Consciousness and Reference", in Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, in press). pdf
"Transparency vs. Revelation in Color Perception", Philosophical Topics (in press). draft
"Causation in Psychiatry", in Kenneth Kendler and Josef Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry (Johns Hopkins University Press, in press).
"Psychological Causation Without Physical Causation", in Kenneth Kendler and Josef Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry (Johns Hopkins University Press, in press).
"What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects?", Mind and Language (in press).
"The Metaphysics of Perception", in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds.), The Metaphysics of Epistemology: Philosophical Issues 17 (Blackwell, in press).
"Consciousness and Language", entry for Patrick Colm Hogan (ed.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences (Cambridge University Press, in press).
Reviews and Discussions
Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content, Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986) 278-291.
Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke, Thoughts, Mind XCVIII (1989) 135-143.
Review of Gareth Evans, Collected Papers, Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989) 156-163.
Précis *of Past Space and Self, and *Replies to comments by José Bermudez, Quassim Cassam and Timothy Williamson, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), 633-634 and 655-670.
"Voices in the Head", review of G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham, When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts, Times Literary Supplement no. 5097, December 8th 2000, p. 13.
Précis of Reference and Consciousness, and Replies to Neil Manson and Georges Rey, Philosophical Studies 126 (2005), 103-114, 145-153, 155-162.
Updated on Tue Aug 14 14:42:22 -0700 2007 by John Campbell