Recent Publications

Books

Berkeley’s Puzzle (with Quassim Cassam) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, August 2014)

Articles

“Personal Identity”, in Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 337-349.

“Relational vs. Kantian Responses to Berkeley’s Puzzle”, in Naomi Eilan, Hemdat Lerman and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Perception, Objectivity and Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 35-50.

“Intelligible Causation”, in Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 232-248.

“Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness”. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies and Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 323-341.

“Why Do Language Use and Tool Use Both Count as Manifestations of Intelligence?”. In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl and Stephen Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 169-182.

“An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention”. In Axel Seeman (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Social Neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 415-430.

“Wittgenstein on the Role of Perception in an Understanding of Language”, in Daniel Guevara and Jonathan Ellis (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 61-71.

“Does Perception Do Any Work In an Understanding of the First Person?”. In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), The Self and Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 102-119.

“Is Spatial Awareness Required for Object Perception?”. In Roxana Baiasu, Adrian Moore and Graham Bird (eds.), Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics Today (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

“On the Thesis that ‘I’ is Not a Referring Term”. In Simon Prosser and François Recanti (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-21.

“Perceiving the Intended Model”. In Peter Machamer and Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 96-122.

“A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle”, Harvard Review of Philosophy, 18 (2012).

“Lichtenberg and the Cogito”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2012), 361-378.

“Causation and Mechanisms in Psychiatry”, in Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini and Tim Thornton (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 935-949.

(With Kenneth S. Kendler) “Expanding the Domain of the Understandable in Psychiatric Illness: An Updating of the Jasperian Framework of Explanation and Understanding”. Psychological Medicine 44 (2014), 1-9.

“Why Is Perceptual Attention Philosophically Interesting?”, in Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).

Reviews and Discussions

“Review Essay on Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity”, Journal of Philosophy, CVIII (2011), 269-285

“Inductions about Attention and Consciousness: Comments on Carolyn Suchy-Dicey, ‘Inductive Scepticism and the Methodological Argument’”. Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (2012) 610–612.

“George Berkeley’s Puzzle”, in David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton (eds.), Philosophy Bites Back (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).

“Susanna Siegel’s The Contents of Visual Experience”, Philosophical Studies 163 (2013), 819-826.

Updated on 2014-03-13 09:48:47 -0700 by John Campbell