Philosophy 290-2

In this seminar, we will look at some recent work on the topic of moral blame. We’ll try to figure out what it is, what functions it subserves, and what hazards it presents to constructive moral relations.

We’ll start with P.F. Strawson’s massively influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, which brought the reactive attitudes into contemporary discussions of freedom and moral accountability, and which continues to be a significant touchstone for work on these topics. We’ll then turn to important recent contributions to the lively debate about moral blame, including primarily treatments that are broadly inspired by Strawson’s approach, as well as a few accounts that depart from it in various ways (for context). The seminar will end by discussing some work in progress by the instructor on the topic of reactive blame.

Some of the specific questions to be addressed include the following: What are the reactive attitudes? What contributions might they make to our practices of accountability and interpersonal blame? What are the functions of this way of responding to moral infractions, and what are its distinctive hazards? Is there a constructive role for reactive blame within the context of the unfolding relationship between wrongdoers and their victims? What scope is there for the normative assessment of reactive blame? How might reactive blame eventually be overcome—through forgiveness, or in other ways—given that its reasons would seem to persist over time?

Readings will include work by Lucy Allais, Agnes Callard, Miranda Fricker, Pamela Hieronymi, Berislav Marušić , T. M. Scanlon, Susan Wolf, and others.