Before coming to Berkeley, I received a B.A. from Kalamazoo College (2006), M.A. from Georgia State University (2010), studied abroad at the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science, and worked as a research assistant in several neuroimaging and psychology labs, including the Moral Cognition Lab at Harvard University.
Much of my work is in the philosophy of mind, action, and moral psychology, but I also have serious interests in metaethics and the philosophy of language. On the empirical side, I’m currently working in the Concepts and Cognition Lab here at Berkeley.
Murray, D., & Lombrozo, T. In Preparation. “Get out of my head!: The effect of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and moral responsibility.”
Murray, D. Forthcoming. “Situationism, Going Mental, and Modal Akrasia.” Philosophical Studies.
Murray, D. & Nahmias, E. 2014. “Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 434-467.
Murray, D., Sytsma, J., and Livengood, J. 2013. “God Knows (But does God Believe?)“ Philosophical Studies 166: 83-107.
Cushman, F.A., Murray, D., Gordon-McKeon, S., Wharton, S., and Greene, J.D. 2012. “Judgment before principle: Engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission.” Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience 7(8): 888-895.
Nahmias, E. & Murray, D. 2010. ”Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions,“ in J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, and K. Frankish (eds.) New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. 189-216.