(B.A., summa cum laude, Williams College, 2009; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2011)
My dissertation is about the following questions. It is often said that social instituions–like games, clubs, etiquette, law, language, etc.–are “normative”. But in exactly what sense are they normative? And how does this normativity constrain our theories of them? Of course, this is a diverse collection of phenomena, and they may not all be normative in exactly the same sense. But, I argue that they are. This means that my work is most controversial when it enters into well-established debates in the philosophy of law and in the debate about the so-called normativity of meaning. I am also interested in philosophy of mind and early Modern philosophy. In the past I have worked on closure, temporal parts, concepts, the preface paradox, the content of perceptual experience, externalism about epistemic justification, and love.