ELEK LANE
April 5, 2024

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley

expected August 2024

B.A. in Philosophy, University of Chicago General and Special Honors June 2016

DISSERTATION

Metaphor in Mind and Language: Metaphor is a phenomenon that draws on narrowly linguistic competencies *and* broader cognitive and cultural abilities. I develop a new theory of how these interact with each other. Upon hearing a metaphor, the audience draws on an analogy between the metaphor's primary and secondary topics; they do this by *seeing* one thing *as* another or *imagining* something to be what it is not. This enables the audience to create a new interpretive scheme and thereby to properly understand the metaphor. In this new interpretive scheme, metaphorical and literal interpretations of the same word are strictly ambiguous. This proposal provides a novel explanation of selective deficits in autistic individuals, particularly those who are unable to comprehend metaphor but who otherwise have full linguistic competence. It also explains recalcitrant linguistic data about attitude reports, inference and entailment, punning and co-predication, and the broader dynamics of metaphor-involving conversations.

Committee: John MacFarlane and Seth Yalcin (co-chairs), Amy Rose Deal (Linguistics)

SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, history of analytic philosophy

COMPETENCE

Feminist philosophy, aesthetics, early modern philosophy

PUBLICATIONS

Semantic Dispositionalism and the Rule-Following Paradox Metaphilosophy 53 (5): 685-695 (2022)

Resolution in §201 of the *Philosophical Investigations Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 98 (2): 393-402 (2020)

Excursus on Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (1): 53-83 (2017)

UNDER REVIEW

Distinguishing Two Kinds of Fictionalism: Metaphor, Autism, and the Imagination

Inescapable Impacts and Escapable Articulations: Hybrid Prohibitionism About Slurs

Metaphor and Ambiguity

Slurs Are Articulation Sensitive (with Edward Schwartz)

What Is Wrong With Deadnaming?

REFEREED TALKS

Slurs Are Articulation Sensitive —Berkeley-Stanford-David Conference, U.C. Berkeley	April 2024
What Is Wrong With Deadnaming? —Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, U.C. Boulder	April 2024
Metaphor as Lexical Ambiguity —Hand, Brain, and Speech Conference, University of Naples	October 2023
Fictionalism About Metaphor and the Problem of Semantic Entailment —Congreso Internacional de Doctorandos en Filosofía, P.U.C. de Chile	September 2023
Semantic Dispositionalism and the Rule-Following Paradox —Berkeley-London Graduate Conference, University of London	May 2022
Non-Verbal Metaphor —Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Conference, Brown University	March 2021
COMMENTARIES	
On "Addressing Mary Midgley's Scholarly Neglect" (Ellie Robson) —Berkeley-London Graduate Conference, U.C. Berkeley	May 2023
On "Insinuations and Speech Acts" (Antonio Monaco) —Pacific APA, San Francisco	April 2023
FELLOWSHIPS and AWARDS	
University of California, Berkeley Graduate Division Travel Grant (x2) Universal Design for Learning Fellowship Dissertation Completion Fellowship Outstanding GSI Award Summer Stipend Award (x3) Regents Fellowship (x4)	2023-24 2024 2023 2022 2018-19, 2021 2017-19
University of Chicago Lee Family Essay Prize Dean's Fund Award Dunn Summer Research Fellowship	2016 2016 2015

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Referee, Australasian Journal of Philosophy Referee, Nordic Wittgenstein Review (x3) Indexer, The Entanglement (Alva Noë) Referee, Berkeley-Stanford-David Conference (x3) 2018-19, 2024 Panelist, Berkeley Connect 2023 Head GSI 2022-23 Coffee Czar 2018-20

LANGUAGES

Native fluency: English

Reading competence: French, German

TEACHING

Main Instructor

Summer 2023 Nature of Mind

Assistant Instructor

Feminism and Philosophy (additionally appeared as guest lecturer)	Spring 2024
Philosophical Methods	Spring 2023
Nature of Mind	Summer 2022
Philosophy of Language	Spring 2022
Merleau-Ponty	Fall 2021
Modern Philosophy	Spring 2021
Introduction to Logic	Fall 2020
Introduction to Logic	Summer 2020
Philosophy of Mind	Spring 2020
Theory of Meaning	Summer 2019
Political Philosophy	Spring 2019

COURSEWORK

Qualifying Exams

Nietzsche's Perspectivism (Andreja Novakovic)	Fall 2019
Radical Contextualism (John MacFarlane)	Fall 2019
Wittgenstein on Concepts (Hans Sluga)	Fall 2019

Credit	
Arguments from Illusion (Mike Martin)	Fall 2018
Aristotle (Tim Clarke)	Spring 2019
Kant (Daniel Warren)	Fall 2018
Abilities, Competence, Know-How (Barry Stroud)	Spring 2018
Vagueness, Truth, and Meaning (John MacFarlane)	Spring 2018
Why Is There Anything Except Physics? (Shamik Dasgupta, Geoff Lee)	Spring 2018
Art, Nature, Experience (Alva Noë)	Fall 2017
Intermediate Logic (Daniel Warren)	Fall 2017
Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations (Hannah Ginsborg)	Fall 2017
First-year graduate seminar (Kristin Primus, Seth Yalcin)	Fall 2017

Audit

Cognition, Rationality, and Philosophical Naturalism (Geoff Lee)	Fall 2023
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Hans Sluga)	Spring 2022
Shakespeare and the Law of Genre (Oliver Arnold)	Fall 2021
Subject, Index, Content (Mike Martin)	Fall 2021
Plato's Sophist (Tim Clarke)	Spring 2021
Conditionals (Seth Yalcin)	Fall 2020
Spinoza (Kristin Primus)	Fall 2020
Time and Causation in Psychology (John Campbell, Mike Martin)	Fall 2020
Vagueness (John MacFarlane)	Spring 2020

REFERENCES

Hannah Ginsborg, Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley ginsborg@berkeley.edu

John MacFarlane, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley jgm@berkeley.edu

Alva Noë, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley noe@berkeley.edu

Seth Yalcin, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley yalcin@berkeley.edu