Online Papers
'Can Representationalism Explain Perceptual Error?'
Draft of 8/11/08
Abstract: In this short paper, I argue that the popular representationalist approach to accounting for perceptual error fails to adequately explain how erroneous perceptual experiences are possible, but instead merely re-describes the phenomenon.
Draft of 1/17/08
Abstract: Many philosophers claim to hold a view of perceptual experience that is a version of, or is at least compatible with, direct realism. It is usually left unclear, however, exactly what direct realism is, and what is involved in affirming it. In this essay I will identify the core commitments of direct realism, and argue that representationalist theories of perceptual experience that are often thought to be compatible with direct realism cannot in fact achieve this while maintaining the aim of providing a theory of perceptual error. I conclude by examining what is required to defend a non-representationalist version of direct realism, as well as suggesting considerations that give direct realism an advantage over alternative views.
'Perceptual Experience and Error'
(link down while under revision)
Abstract: In this essay I examine the motivation for representationalism, the commonly held view that perceptual experiences have representational content. One main reason for holding this view is the assumption that it is required in order to explain the possibility of perceptual error. I claim that this assumption is mistaken because a non-representational theory of perceptual experience can use other resources to explain perceptual error. I support this claim by presenting and defending a relational view of perceptual experience that gives an account of normal perceptual experience, illusions and hallucinations. In particular, I will focus on the idea that perceptual appearances, rather than being subjective properties of experiences, are rather relational properties of objects in the environment.
'Concepts and Imagery in Episodic Memory'
Anthropology and Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1, December 2006
Abstract: A certain view about the relation between perceptual experience and mental imagery in episodic memory—that imagery in recall matches the experience retained in it—can make it difficult to understand how conceptualism, the view that perceptual experience requires the possession of relevant concept capacities, could be true. For if a subject’s conceptual capacities determine what the phenomenology of an experience (or memory of it) is like, then one would expect a perceptual experience and its recall in memory to differ in phenomenology if they involve different concepts. In this essay, I solve this puzzle for conceptualism by undermining the assumption that there is a match between imagery in episodic memory and the phenomenal character of experience.
'Memory and the Content of Experience'
Draft of 9/25/06
Abstract: In ‘Perception, Concepts, and Memory’, Michael Martin (1992) claims that the role perception plays in memory provides us with reason to think that perceptual experiences are not fully conceptual. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon he cites in favor of his claim does not in fact support it. Rather, I suggest that what is needed is a new way of thinking about concepts and how they are involved in perception.
Updated on Mon Aug 11 14:42:45 -0700 2008 by James Genone