Anandi Hattiangadi packs a lot of argument into this lucid, well-informed and lively examination of the meaning scepticism which Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein. Her verdict on the success of the sceptical considerations is mixed. She concludes that they are sufficient to rule out all accounts of meaning and mental content proposed so far. But she believes that they fail to constitute, as Kripke supposed they did, a fully general argument against the possibility of meaning or content. Even though we are not now in a position to specify facts in which meaning consists, the view that there are such facts, and more specifically that they satisfy the intuitive conception of meaning which she labels ‘semantic realism’, remains a live option. Moreover, given that she takes the sceptical conclusion to be self-refuting and therefore incoherent, this is the option she thinks we should endorse.

The negative aspect of Hattiangadi’s verdict derives primarily from her rejection of Kripke’s assumption that there is a normative relation between meaning and use, or (to use a now standard, but in my view somewhat misleading, formulation) that ‘meaning is normative’. The requirement on meaning facts generated by this assumption — that they should have implications not just for how a term is used, but for how it ought to be used — is taken by Kripke to rule out dispositional theories of meaning, and plausibly applies against other reductionist theories as well. Kripke adds two further arguments against dispositionalism, from the supposed finiteness of dispositions, and from the fact that we can be disposed to make mistakes, but he regards these as less fundamental and suggests that they ‘boil down to’ the normativity objection (Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 24). Hattiangadi takes the scope of the normativity objection to be broader than Kripke himself does, holding that if meaning were indeed normative then we would have grounds to rule out not just reductionist accounts of meaning, but non-reductionist views as well. Conversely, she takes the normativity objection to be not only sufficient but necessary for a general argument against accounts of both kinds. Rejecting the assumption of the ‘normativity of meaning’ is thus, as she sees it, decisive against Kripke’s aspiration to have provided a general argument against the possibility of meaning facts.

What of the other considerations which Kripke offers against the possibility of meaning facts? Hattiangadi thinks that the objection from finiteness which Kripke offers against dispositionalism can be adequately answered by adopting Blackburn’s suggestion that the fact of our meaning, say, addition, is constituted not by a single disposition to add but by a complex of simpler dispositions including the disposition to add single digits and the disposition
to ‘carry’ (pp. 23–4). She takes the objection from mistakes, on the other hand, to be much more powerful, regarding it as decisive not only against a variety of dispositionalist and other naturalistic reductive accounts (success semantics, teleosemantics, Fodor’s informationalist semantics, and views that appeal to community use), but also against accounts which she classifies as anti-reductionist, such as the view that meaning is a quale and the view that meaning and understanding are capacities. She concludes from a detailed and comprehensive survey of theories of meaning (Chs 5 and 6) that no extant theory is tenable. Each theory fails, either because of the argument from mistakes, or because of related difficulties (e.g. the qua problem for causal theories of reference), or, as in the case of a large class of anti-reductionist views, because it relies on the very notion of intentional content which it is supposed to explain. But the combined force of the considerations does not amount to what she calls an a priori argument against the possibility of meaning facts, so the prospect is left open of an account of meaning which resists the sceptical worries.

The bulk of this discussion will be concerned with Hattiangadi’s challenge to the normativity objection. But before turning to that, I want to raise a problem for her endorsement of the objection from mistakes. Consider a dispositionalist who claims, against Kripke’s sceptic, that the fact of my meaning addition is the fact of my being disposed to give the sum in response to ‘plus’ questions. The objection from mistakes starts out from the observation that I am also disposed, for example when tired or distracted, to respond to ‘plus’ questions with numbers that are not the sum. A realist about dispositions will interpret this phenomenon as a case of one disposition’s interfering with another. The fact that I am disposed to make mistakes does not imply that my meaning addition by ‘plus’ cannot be identified with my disposition to add; it simply means that I have other dispositions which interfere with the actualization of my meaning-constituting disposition. But Hattiangadi thinks that this is insufficient, since the sceptic ‘can easily claim that it is my disposition to give deviant responses which determines what I mean’ (p. 108). In order to respond satisfactorily to the sceptic, the dispositionalist has to meet a further demand. ‘If we want the dispositional theory to account for my meaning addition by “plus”, there must be some principled way to uniquely identify the disposition to respond with sums of numbers as meaning-constituting, so that other “interfering” dispositions can legitimately be ruled out as error-producing’ (ibid.). And she goes on to argue that this demand cannot be met. The dispositionalist might try, for example, to identify the disposition to add as meaning-constituting on the grounds that it corresponds to how I would respond to ‘plus’ questions when I am not tired or distracted and when the numbers are not too large. But it seems clear that no such specification of ideal conditions would be sufficient to ensure that I would always respond, under those conditions, with the sum.
The line of argument which Hattiangadi develops here is familiar; in particular, as she notes, from Boghossian’s influential 1989 paper ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’ (Mind, 98, pp. 507–49). But the demand which she, and others, make on the dispositionalist strikes me as unmotivated. On the face of it, the dispositionalist has met Kripke’s sceptical challenge by identifying the fact which constitutes my meaning addition by ‘plus’: it is the fact that I am disposed to give the sum. Why does he need to give some further explanation of why it is this disposition rather than some other disposition (whether my disposition to give answers to ‘plus’ questions that are not the sum, or my disposition to say ‘Umm … ’ when asked a ‘plus’ question which I cannot answer right away, or, for that matter, my disposition to look both ways before crossing the road) which is the fact of my meaning addition by ‘plus’? Or, if he is under some obligation to rule out the sceptic’s alternative hypothesis, why is it not enough simply to point out that the disposition he has privileged is the disposition to give the sum, which is clearly a more natural candidate for the fact of meaning addition?

Presumably Hattiangadi would reject this last response as circular: the dispositionalist, as she puts it, ‘fails to provide a way of non-circularly distinguishing the meaning-constituting dispositions from the error-producing ones’ (p. 108). However it is not clear what is circular about specifying the disposition as the disposition to add. (Here I draw on McDowell’s ‘In Defence of Modesty’, originally in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, ed. B. Taylor (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), and reprinted in John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). For more discussion see sections two and three of my ‘Inside and Outside Language: Stroud’s Nonreductionism About Meaning’, forthcoming in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding, ed. J. Bridges, N. Kolodny, and W. Wong (Oxford: Oxford University Press).) There would indeed be something circular about specifying it as the disposition to believe or assert that some number is the sum, for that would be to give an account of someone’s meaning addition in terms which presuppose the notion of meaning addition. But the claim that I am disposed to add does not take for granted the notion of meaning addition, but only that of addition. It is true that, if I myself make this identification in response to the sceptic, I am drawing on my own grasp of the meaning of ‘plus’ and in this way taking for granted that ‘plus’ means addition. But Kripke’s initial formulation of the sceptical challenge, in terms of what I meant by ‘plus’ in the past, is meant to allow for precisely this possibility. ‘If we are querying the meaning of the word “plus”, how can we use it … at the same time? So I suppose that the sceptic assumes that he and I agree in our present uses of the word “plus”: we both use it to denote addition.’ It is only once it has been shown that ‘there is no fact about which particular function I meant in the past’ that we can ‘pull the rug out from under own feet’ by concluding that there is no fact about what I mean in the present either (Kripke 1982, p. 13).
As long as the sceptical challenge is confined to the past, there is nothing wrong with my identifying my former meaning-constituting disposition as the disposition to add. Unless the sceptic can find some independent grounds to challenge the dispositional account, the sceptical challenge stops there.

It might be objected in Hattiangadi’s defence that Kripke himself endorses the requirement that the meaning-constituting disposition be characterized without the use of terms like ‘plus’ or ‘addition’. In his own treatment of the objection from mistakes, he describes the dispositionalist as holding that ‘the function someone means is to be read off from his dispositions; it cannot be assumed in advance which function is meant’ (Kripke 1982, pp. 29–30). The metaphor of ‘reading off’ suggests in the first instance that he takes the dispositionalist to be committed to providing a specification of the meaning-constituting disposition from which it can be learned which function the person means, for example that it is addition rather than skaddition (where skaddition is the function whose values correspond to what we would ordinarily call the person’s ‘mistakes’). But this on its own does not motivate the demand for a specification which does not use the term ‘addition’, since we can learn that it is addition and not skaddition that the person means from the information that he is disposed to add rather than skadd. What Kripke seems to have in mind, then, is a stronger requirement: that the person’s dispositions be specified in such a way that someone who herself did not know the meaning of ‘plus’ or any other related expression, and who thus lacked the concept of addition, could acquire the concept of addition from that specification. This indeed requires the dispositionalist to offer a specification of the person’s dispositions which does not appeal to the concept of addition. But the requirement goes well beyond the original sceptical demand, which was simply to specify a fact which constitutes meaning addition by ‘plus’.

Why does Kripke endorse the stronger requirement? I think that it is because of his commitment to the idea, which he takes to be implicit in the idea of a normative relation between meaning and use, that the meaning of an expression must guide or justify me in its use, that it must ‘tell me what I ought to do in each new instance’ (Kripke 1982, p. 24). While he is not explicit about this, his assumption seems to be that any account of meaning, including that offered by the dispositionalist, must do justice to this requirement. So he understands the dispositionalist as aiming to provide a specification of the meaning-constituting disposition which can play this guiding role. I must not only be disposed to give the sum, but must do so because I have somehow internalized a specification of my disposition from which I can discover which answer I ought to give. But this is clearly not an assumption which Hattiangadi wants to accept. She makes quite clear that neither the ‘normativity of meaning’, nor the more specific idea that meaning facts are prescriptive or play a role in guiding behaviour, are any part of semantic realism: the latter idea in particular is epistemological,
whereas semantic realism is a metaphysical thesis (p. 53). Moreover, her central argument against Kripke’s scepticism is directed against the thesis that meaning is normative. She seems, then, to have no reason to follow Kripke in accepting the objection from mistakes. And this is indeed suggested by Kripke himself when he says that other objections to dispositionalism ‘boil down to’ the normativity objection. If Hattiangadi is correct in denying the normativity of meaning, then it would seem that we have no reason not to accept a reductive naturalist view like that offered by the realist dispositionalist.

I turn now to Hattiangadi’s treatment of the normativity objection. The crux of the objection, according to Kripke, is that the dispositionalist gives a ‘descriptive’ account of the relation between the meaning of an expression and its use, whereas the proper relation is ‘normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer “125”, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of ‘+’, I should answer “125”’ (Kripke 1982, p. 37). Hattiangadi takes Kripke’s normativity claim to allow of two possible interpretations. On the stronger interpretation, which she takes to correspond to the more central of two senses of the term ‘normative’, meaning is prescriptive or action-guiding. On this interpretation, the claim that meaning is normative amounts, at a first approximation, to a principle she calls Normativity: $S$ means $F$ by $x \rightarrow (a)(S$ ought to (apply $x$ to $a$) $\leftrightarrow a$ is $f$) (p. 57). (Here as in other formulations, $S$ is a person, $F$ a meaning or content, $a$ an object or suitable referent for $x$, and $f$ a feature or set of features. I have corrected what appear to be misprints in some of the formulations.) On the weaker interpretation, to say that meaning is normative is merely to say that there is a rule which distinguishes my uses of a term into those which do and those which do not accord with the rule. This can be formalized, she says, as Norm-Relativity: $S$ means $F$ by $x \rightarrow (a)(S$ applies $x$ ‘correctly’ to $a \leftrightarrow a$ is $f$) (p. 56). Hattiangadi argues that, while Normativity would provide an effective argument against the possibility of meaning facts, along the lines of Moore’s Open Question argument, it is untenable. For Normativity implies that we ought always to assert what is true, but we do not have any categorical semantic obligations: there are, for example, many circumstances in which it is permissible to lie. Norm-Relativity, on the other hand, is plausible and probably true, but ‘anodyne’ (p. 7). In particular, it does not rule out dispositionalism or any other reductive view: the only objection which is effective against dispositionalism is the objection from mistakes (p. 61).

A preliminary point to make about Hattiangadi’s line of argument concerns her formalization of these two interpretations. As she points out, Normativity itself is too strong, not only because (as she argues) we lack semantic obligations, but because, even if we did have semantic obligations, they could not reasonably impose on us the impossible task of applying, say, ‘green’ to everything which was green. In order to accommodate this point, she offers the normativist the weaker Normativity*: $S$ means $F$ by $x \rightarrow (a)$
(S ought to (apply $x$ to $a$) → $a$ is $f$) (p. 181). She takes this principle to imply that ‘a speaker who means something by an expression ought to ensure that she uses it only when it is correct to do so’, suggesting, plausibly, that this might, if true, be sufficient to generate an argument against semantic realism (p. 181). But in fact Normativity* does not have the implication she ascribes to it. The principle does not require, of a non-$f$ thing, that a speaker refrain from applying $x$ to it; it merely states that it is not the case that the speaker ought to apply $x$ to it. And this is too weak to capture the intuition that meaning is normative. A better choice, given what Hattiangadi presumably intends, would be a wide-scope principle along the lines of Normativity**: S means $F$ by $x \to (a)(S$ ought to see to it that (apply $x$ to $a$) = $a$ is $f$)). Alternatively, one might capture the intuition with the narrow-scope principle that S means $F$ by $a \to (a)$ (a is not-$f$ → S ought to (not apply $x$ to $a$)) (for this suggestion I am indebted to John MacFarlane and Niko Kolodny). (Hattiangadi acknowledges the problem with Normativity* in her 2009 paper ‘Some More Thoughts on Semantic Oughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting’ (Analysis, 69, pp. 54–63), offering a different narrow-scope formulation. I do not have space to explore the difference among the various alternatives, but I do not think that anything in the remaining discussion turns on it.) One might also question Hattiangadi’s formulation of Norm-Relativity for reasons analogous to those which lead her to reject the original Normativity as too strong. As the principle stands, it seems to have the implausible consequence that if a speaker means green by ‘green’, then she will ‘correctly’ apply, and a fortiori apply, ‘green’ to every green thing. Norm-Relativity might thus be better stated as the principle that S means $F$ by $a \to (a)$ (S applies $x$ to $a$ → S applies $x$ ‘correctly’ to $a \leftrightarrow a$ is $f$). However, for convenience, I will continue to use Hattiangadi’s formulation.

These clarifications in place, how does the argument fare? Let us consider first the claim that Normativity** is untenable. One reservation one might have here is that the expression ‘S ought to $\varphi$’ itself retains some of the ambiguity in the expression ‘normative’. It is not clear that this expression always does convey practical obligation, as Hattiangadi seems to take it to do. However, it is certainly natural to read it as conveying some kind of requirement of practical rationality, for example as expressing that S has a strong or conclusive reason to $\varphi$. And even on this reading, which I take to be somewhat weaker than a reading in terms of obligation, Normativity** is implausible for the same kinds of reasons invoked by Hattiangadi to deny semantic obligations. That ‘green’ means green does not generate even a prima facie reason for me to refrain from applying it to things that are not green, except on the independent assumption that I have reason to speak the truth. And Hattiangadi’s arguments against deriving semantic obligations from social convention, or from the idea that grasping meaning constitutes a kind of contractual commitment, are persuasive both in their own right,
and against analogous proposals with respect to the idea that the meaning of a term can generate reasons for its use.

Hattiangadi allows that the semantic realist is committed to the claim that meaningful terms have correctness conditions, a claim which she describes as the ‘thesis of semantic realism’ and formulates as follows (p. 52): \( x \text{ means } F \rightarrow (a) \) (\( x \) applies correctly to \( a \leftrightarrow a \text{ is } f \)). She says that this would be sufficient for the normativity of meaning, in the sense needed for the normativity objection to be effective, if ‘correctly’ were functioning as an evaluative term. But she does not think it is; rather, ‘applies correctly’ is ‘merely a placeholder for the various semantic relations an expression can have to the world: it stands for either “\( x \) refers to \( a \)” “\( x \) denotes \( a \)” or “\( x \) is true of \( a \)” (p. 52). The thesis of semantic realism, combined with the assumption that meaning something by an expression is following a rule with respect to its use, does indeed, she says, entail the principle of Norm-Relativity already mentioned, that is, that \( S \) means \( F \) by \( x \rightarrow (a) \) (\( S \) applies \( x \) ‘correctly’ to \( a \leftrightarrow a \text{ is } f \)). But ‘correct’ in this context, she argues, is not a normative or evaluative term. To say that \( S \) applies \( x \) correctly is not to say that \( S \) ought to apply \( x \) in that way, but simply to classify her use as meeting a standard, specifically as satisfying ‘the conditions under which an expression applies (i.e. refers to, is true of, denotes)’ (p. 60). In saying that some use of an expression is correct, then, all we are saying is ‘that it refers to or is true of the thing to which it has been applied’ (p. 60), and since reference and truth are not normative notions, nothing follows regarding the normativity of meaning.

Now it is quite true that, if we understand ‘normative’ as having what Hattiangadi describes as its ‘primary’ sense of ‘prescriptive’ or ‘action-guiding’ (p. 37), then ‘correct’ in the semantic context is not functioning as a normative term. But in the context of assessing Kripke’s sceptical argument, the question is whether the normativity objection against dispositionalism and other reductive views requires this strong sense of ‘normative’. Could the sceptic not argue that dispositionalism fails to accommodate the idea of uses being correct or incorrect, even if there is nothing more to the idea of being correct than that of meeting a standard? The supposition that someone is disposed to use a term in a certain way does indeed allow us to distinguish one set of uses of the term as actualizing the disposition, and the others as the result of interference with the disposition. But, the sceptic might argue, this is not enough to entitle us to privilege the first set of uses as correct, even on the assumption that ‘correct’ is not normative in the primary sense. Even granted that there is no normative requirement to do what is correct, there is still more to being correct than simply being the actualization of a disposition. Hattiangadi would most likely reply that ‘correct’ in the context of Norm-Relativity is a mere placeholder. When we say ‘\( S \) applies \( x \) correctly to \( a' \), we are not ascribing a genuine feature, but merely uttering a stand-in for a semantic expression, such as ‘\( S \) predicates \( x \) truly of \( a' \) or ‘\( S \) refers to \( a' \)
with \( x' \). (I take it that this the point of the scare-quotes around ‘correct’ in the statement of Norm-Relativity on p. 56). So it would be begging the question against a dispositionalist view of meaning if we were to say that it could not accommodate the idea of ‘correct’ use: this would be just like objecting, against the dispositional view, that it cannot account for expressions having semantic properties.

But the ‘placeholder’ view of correctness is questionable, at least in the context of Norm-Relativity. Hattiangadi might indeed be right to say that the expression ‘applies correctly’ in the thesis of semantic realism is a placeholder for the expressions ‘true of’, ‘refers to’, and ‘denotes’. If we want to leave open whether a given term is a referring expression or a predicate, but still want to talk about the conditions of its successfully referring to, or being truly predicated of, a thing, we might speak of the conditions under which it ‘applies correctly’. However, there is no reason to think that this has any implications for how ‘correct’ is functioning when we are talking of whether a person applies an expression correctly or whether some use of it is correct. This is particularly so in view of the fact that ‘correctly’ is superfluous, or even out of place, in a statement like ‘\( x \) applies correctly to \( a \leftrightarrow x \) is \( f \)’ (this was pointed out to me by Gideon Rosen). The same fact could be stated better by saying ‘\( x \) applies to \( a \leftrightarrow x \) is \( f \)’. A case might be made for saying that ‘applies’ in this formulation is a placeholder for the more specific semantic expressions ‘denotes’ or ‘is true of’, and that ‘applies correctly’ has the same placeholder function; but clearly nothing follows from that regarding whether or not ‘correctly’ itself is serving as a placeholder. Nor is there any independent reason to think that ‘correct’ is a placeholder in the case where it is a person’s application of \( x \) to \( a \) which is being described as ‘correct’. It is one thing to say that we can describe a person’s use of an expression as correct only if it has certain semantic features, for example if it amounts to her saying something true or to her referring correctly. But it is another thing to say that the ascription of correctness can simply be replaced with the ascription of one of these features, so that ‘correct’ just stands in for, say, ‘true’. We might indeed hold, along lines suggested by Gideon Rosen, that these semantic features are ‘correct-making’, that is that someone’s use of an expression must manifest one of these features in order to count as correct (see Rosen, ‘Brandom on Modality, Normativity and Intentionality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63 (2001), p. 619). However, this is compatible with the idea that her use of the expression is correct in virtue of having one or other of the features. It does not require us to suppose that our calling the use ‘correct’ is simply a device for saying that it has one of those features, while leaving indeterminate which feature it is.

This does not settle the question against the dispositionalist, though, because it is not clear that Hattiangadi needs anything as strong as the ‘placeholder’ view of correctness in order to maintain that Norm-Relativity is ineffective against reductive views. Even if there is a genuine property of
correctness which is possessed by, among other things, true predications, it is open to the dispositionalist to argue that it can, along with meaning and truth, be naturalistically construed. Once the defender of the normativity objection has conceded that ‘S φs correctly’ does not imply ‘S ought to φ’, then there is no longer any reason to suppose that dispositional facts cannot imply facts about what is correct, any more than facts about which uses of expressions are true predications. The dispositionalist can say that it simply follows from the dispositional account of meaning that those uses of an expression which actualize a person’s disposition to use it are correct, and that it begs the question to rule out the dispositionalist account in advance on the grounds that it cannot accommodate ascriptions of correctness and incorrectness to our use of expressions. So I think that Hattiangadi is right to conclude that Norm-Relativity is ‘anodyne’ against the dispositionalist, even if we drop the scare-quotes around ‘correct’. However, there is a further approach available to the normativist, which Hattiangadi does not consider. Rather than merely saying that facts about meaning imply facts about correct use, the normativist can make the stronger claim that facts about meaning are, at least in part, constituted by facts about correct use, or relatedly, that the thought of an expression’s having a correct use is prior to the thought of its having a meaning. (The distinction I draw here parallels those drawn in Rosen 2001, p. 617, and in Boghossian’s ‘The Normativity of Content’ (Philosophical Issues, 13 (2003), Philosophy of Mind, pp. 37–8).) The normativist, that is, can appeal to the intuition that we understand what it is for a term to be meaningful only by understanding that certain uses of it are correct and others are not correct. If the notion of a term’s being meaningful depends in this way on the notion of its having a correct use, then the dispositionalist is in trouble, since we can perfectly well make sense of a person’s being disposed to use a term in a certain way, and hence, on the dispositionalist view, of her using the term meaningfully, without helping ourselves to the thought that her uses can either be, or not be, correct.

Is this approach defensible? The major difficulty that it confronts is that, even if it is granted against Hattiangadi that correctness is a genuine property, it still does not seem on the face of it to be a property which instances of behaviour possess simpliciter. To say that an instance of behaviour is correct would seem to imply that it conforms to a standard, and our attributions of correctness seem to depend on our measuring the behaviour against one standard rather than another. When you add vermouth to the gin, or stir the eggs in the pan, or play an E-flat major triad over F and B in the bass, what you do may be correct, but it is not correct tout court. It is correct only on the assumption that you are mixing a martini, making scrambled eggs, or voicing a G7alt upper structure, and not on the assumption that you are, say, trying to mix a gin fizz, make an omelette, or voice a root position F7 with a flattened ninth. Our assumption about what you are doing, or intending to do, sets the standard against which your behaviour qualifies, or does not
qualify, as correct. Now, to repeat the point about correctness being a genuine property, the difficulty here is not that there is nothing to the idea of meeting a standard beyond that of satisfying a description. When we say that your chord voicing or drink mixing was correct, against the background assumption that you were trying to play G common or mix a martini, we are not just saying, or implying, that you played G common or mixed a martini. There is something conveyed by the use of the term ‘correct’ which cannot be captured by simply offering a description of what you were doing, even if we add that what you did conformed to a description of what you were trying to do. The difficulty is, rather, that this non-descriptive element seems to depend on the prior assumption of an applicable standard. If this is so, then we cannot make sense of someone’s using an expression correctly on a given occasion unless we are already assuming a standard of correctness applying to uses of that expression. And that in turn requires, either that we assume that the expression has a meaning, or that we take the individual or her community to have determinate intentions with respect to the use of the expression. That would seem to put paid to the suggestion that we can think of facts of meaning, or intentional content more generally, as constituted in part by facts of correct use.

But, while this is not the place to pursue the point in depth, I do not think that the difficulty is insuperable. For there is a case to be made for the view that certain instances of behaviour, and in particular uses of linguistic expressions, can be intelligibly regarded as correct or appropriate in a way which does not presuppose our thinking of them as meaningful, or as subject to standards of correctness imposed by the speaker’s or community’s intentions. (I argue for this view in my ‘Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules’ (forthcoming in Journal of Philosophy), and in sections four and five of my ‘Inside and Outside Language: Stroud’s Nonreductionism About Meaning’ (forthcoming, details given above.) For a simple example, we can consider the cases of ‘going on’ behaviour discussed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, in particular the pupil at §185 who continues the ‘+2’ series with ‘1004, 1008’. As I see it, we do not first have to attach a determinate meaning to ‘+’ in order to deny that a pupil who goes on in this way is going on correctly or appropriately. There is something that is ‘primarily’ correct, or correct simpliciter about continuing the series ‘2, 4, 6, 8, …, 1000’ with ‘1002’, in that our taking ‘1002’ to be the appropriate continuation does not depend on our having specified a rule or standard with which ‘1002’ can be said to accord. An even simpler example is afforded by Wittgenstein’s case, also in §185, of the pointing hand. It strikes us as correct or appropriate to look in the direction of wrist to finger-tip rather than finger-tip to wrist, but this does not seem to depend on our antecedently having acknowledged a rule determining the correct response to a pointing
hand, or having understood the pointing gesture as having one meaning rather than another. The point of these examples can be carried over to the use of linguistic expressions. If a child has been taught the use of the term ‘green’ in connection with an initial sample of green objects, and then goes on to apply the term in a novel case, we can think of her, and she can think of herself, as using ‘green’ appropriately in the new case, but this need not presuppose that we think of ‘green’ as having a determinate meaning, in particular as meaning green rather than grue.

If this conception of primitive correctness holds up, then there are prospects for a view on which meaning is constituted in part by facts about correct use. In particular, we can suppose that a term like ‘green’ is meaningful to us, that is, that we take it to have meaning, in virtue of the fact that we are disposed not only to apply ‘green’ to green things, but to take ourselves, in each such application, to be applying ‘green’ correctly or appropriately in the primitive sense just indicated. This constitutes an objection to the reductive dispositionalist along the lines of the normativity objection, since the reductive dispositionalist cannot accommodate the role of correctness in constituting meaning. And, although this point is not essential for making this objection against dispositionalism, the suggested view is also a plausible candidate for capturing the intuition that there is something normative about the meaningful use of expressions. While in many contexts the terms ‘normative’ and ‘ought’ are used in ways which imply a connection with reasons for action, so that what is normative for us, or what we ought to do, is what we have good or conclusive reason to do, there is no reason to think of this as the primary use of these terms. It seems more plausible to think of the words ‘normative’ and ‘ought’ as having a more generic sense, such that we can speak of a norm for the use of an expression, or of how the expression ought to be used, or even of how speakers of a given language ought to use the expression, without the more specific implication that there are reasons to use the expression in that way rather than in any other. As long as it is clear that it is this sense of ‘normative’ which we have in mind, rather than the stronger and more specialized sense emphasized by Hattiangadi, then there is no obstacle to describing the correctness or appropriateness of our use of a term as a normative feature of it.

It should be clear by now that I am not persuaded by Hattiangadi’s main line of argument. Her book represents, nonetheless, a significant contribution to the debate about meaning scepticism, both in the forceful and sharply delineated challenge it presents to the thesis that meaning is normative, and in its very helpful and comprehensive overview of the landscape of positions occupied by other participants in the debate. With its wealth and detail of argument, as well as the clearly articulated theses it presents, it sets up the central issues of a well-worked-over debate in a way which opens
new avenues for discussion. It should be read, and its arguments considered carefully, by anyone interested in scepticism about rules and meaning.

_How Terrorism is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence_,

Virginia Held has been a significant contributor to philosophical debates about terrorism, and indeed many other questions of public importance, for decades, and it is good to have her considered thoughts about terrorism and related matters collected in one volume.

The essays, mostly versions of previously published papers, are wide-ranging, dealing with the definition of terrorism, the futility of the ‘war on terror’, the media’s reactions to terrorism, the concept of ‘legitimate authority’ in non-state groups using violence, group responsibility for violence, and the relevance to the topic of ‘the ethics of care’. All of these issues are addressed with scholarship, fairness, and sanity. In what follows, I shall for reasons of space and interest concentrate upon some important claims by Held with which I disagree. My criticisms should not obscure the fact that there is much to admire in this appealing book.

Though generally condemnatory of terrorism, Held has resisted any tinge of the hysteria and holier-than-thou tone that disfigures much popular and academic reaction to the complex phenomenon that is terrorism. Indeed, so anxious is she to be fair and to apply the same standards to putative terrorists as to their opponents that she argues for the view that terrorism may sometimes be justifiable on non-consequentialist grounds. This is one of her most distinctive contributions on the topic. It is to be expected that some theorists (and many terrorist practitioners) would try to justify a resort to terrorism in self-interested or utilitarian or other consequentialist terms, or as a form of self-defence when other responses are unavailable, but Held argues her case on the grounds of distributive justice.

In her chapter four (‘Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals’) Held concludes that in certain circumstances where there exist violations of fundamental human rights of one group and not of another, it may be justifiable to redistribute rights violations so that the previously immune group members suffer them. Assuming that terrorism involves relevant human rights violations, this will licence acts of terrorism on grounds of justice. The basic scenario is a society $S_1$ in which group A enjoys the satisfaction of human