BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
METHOD:PUBLISH
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
PRODID:iCalendar-Ruby
BEGIN:VEVENT
LOCATION:60 Evans Hall
SEQUENCE:0
DTEND:20091023T180000
DTSTART:20091023T161000
UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:585
DTSTAMP:20091124T192716
DESCRIPTION:Decision theory is supposed to accommodate any preferences that
  a rational decision maker might have.  I show that standard decision theor
 y – expected utility theory – cannot accommodate common preferences that st
 em from the way apparently rational decision makers account for risk.  I pr
 opose a generalization of expected utility theory that can accommodate thes
 e preferences\, and show that it has all the theoretical power of the stand
 ard theory: in particular\, it has a representation theorem that allows us 
 to derive an agent’s beliefs\, desires\, and attitudes towards risk from hi
 s preferences.  I then explore a classic strategy for responding to counter
 examples of the type I present: re-characterizing the choice problem facing
  an agent\, by individuating outcomes more finely.  This introduces an impo
 rtant question in the methodology of decision theory: under what circumstan
 ces should we interpret the agent as facing a different choice problem rath
 er than adopt a different theory to describe his behavior?  I approach this
  question formally\, and show that we cannot individuate the outcomes to ma
 ke his behavior compatible with expected utility theory without also making
  his behavior compatible with many other opposing theories: thus\, I sugges
 t\, we cannot save the standard theory.
SUMMARY:Logic Colloquium\nLara Buchak\nDifferent Decision or Different Deci
 sion Theory?: Modeling Risk Aversion
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR