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VERSION:2.0
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LOCATION:Howison Library
SEQUENCE:0
DTEND:20091105T180000
DTSTART:20091105T161000
UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:552
DTSTAMP:20091123T233417
DESCRIPTION:Consider two theses about causation: (1) Causes are connected t
 o their effects by way of mediating _causal mechanisms_ or _processes_\; (2
 ) Scientific inquiry aims (at least in part) at discerning and describing t
 he _causal structure_ of our world.  Some of the best contemporary work on 
 causation claims—often implicitly\, but sometimes quite explicitly—that\, i
 n giving an account of causation\, we should sacrifice (1) for the sake of 
 producing an account that makes the best sense of (2). I will first try to 
 show why this claim is quite attractive\, and then obstreperously argue aga
 inst it: I will aim to show that the best \nway to make sense of (2) is\, i
 n fact\, by means of an account of causal structure that fully vindicates (
 1).
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium\nNed Hall\nIn Praise of Causal Mechanisms
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