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LOCATION:Howison Library
SEQUENCE:0
DTEND:20091008T180000
DTSTART:20091008T161000
UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:543
DTSTAMP:20091124T200946
DESCRIPTION:Empiricism\, as a philosophical position\, is associated first 
 of all with a distinctive view of science as aiming at adequate representat
 ion of the phenomena rather than discovery of any\ndeeper reality ‘behind’ 
 the phenomena. What further views\, on other philosophical issues\, can be 
 palatable to an empiricist? I’ll explore this with reference to philosophic
 al naturalism\, metaphysical realism\, and the transcendence of the Self.\n
 \n*Lecture 3*\n\nHaving come to indexicality\, self-reference\, and Moore’s
  Paradox\, the problem of the Self’s place in nature cannot be far behind. 
 Is it possible to understand ourselves in the same way that we can understa
 nd natural phenomena? What Kant called the illusions of reason beckon here\
 , but their false promises may be shown up if we subject the possibility of
  ‘objective’ scientific accounts of ourselves to a deeper logical scrutiny.
  While wishing to convey an existentialist theme\, and though planning to p
 resent the material in non-technical form\, the background to my argument i
 ncludes technical literature about self-reference.\n\nThomason\, Richmond "
 A Note On Syntactical Treatments Of Modality." *Synthese* 44 (1980): 391-39
 5.\n\nCross\, Charles B. “A Theorem Concerning Syntactical Treatments of No
 nidealized Belief”. *Synthese* 129 (2001): 335-341.\n\nvan Fraassen\, Bas C
 . "Transcendence of the Ego: The Non-Existent Knight"\, *Ratio* (new series
 ) XVII (2004)\, 453-477.
SUMMARY:Townsend Visitor\nBas C. van Fraassen\nThe Self--Beyond the Illusio
 ns of Reason
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