BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 METHOD:PUBLISH CALSCALE:GREGORIAN PRODID:iCalendar-Ruby BEGIN:VEVENT LOCATION:Howison Library SEQUENCE:0 DTEND:20091001T180000 DTSTART:20091001T161000 UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:541 DTSTAMP:20091124T195024 DESCRIPTION:Empiricism\, as a philosophical position\, is associated first of all with a distinctive view of science as aiming at adequate representat ion of the phenomena rather than discovery of any\ndeeper reality ‘behind’ the phenomena. What further views\, on other philosophical issues\, can be palatable to an empiricist? I’ll explore this with reference to philosophic al naturalism\, metaphysical realism\, and the transcendence of the Self.\n \n*Lecture 2*\n\nCommon sense realism is just that such familiar objects as rocks\, trees\, and stars are real. Metaphysical realism adds that their e xistence is independent of what we may think or can\nconceive. But this slo gan harbors a troubling ambiguity\, and realist arguments tend to demolish only anti-realism as conceived from a realist point of view. My stalking ho rse here is David Lewis’ ‘menu of philosophical positions’ as explored by h is student Mary Kate McGowan. Introducing the essential indexical\, and an appreciation of Moore’s Paradox\, may radically\nchange the realist/anti-re alist dialogue.\n\nLewis\, David K. “Introduction”\, pp. ix-xii in his *Phi losophical Papers*\, vol. 1. Oxford 1983.\n\nMcGowan\, Mary Kate “Gruesome Connections\,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 52 (2002): 21–33.\n\nvan Fraassen\ , Bas C. "Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded"\, *Ph ilosophical Perspectives* 11 (1997): 17-42 (= Supplement to *Nous* vol. 31) available at\n SUMMARY:Townsend Visitor\nBas C. van Fraassen\nWill the Real Anti-Realist P lease Stand Up? END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR