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LOCATION:Howison Library
SEQUENCE:0
DTEND:20090929T180000
DTSTART:20090929T161000
UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:540
DTSTAMP:20091124T200545
DESCRIPTION:Empiricism\, as a philosophical position\, is associated first 
 of all with a distinctive view of science as aiming at adequate representat
 ion of the phenomena rather than discovery of any\ndeeper reality ‘behind’ 
 the phenomena. What further views\, on other philosophical issues\, can be 
 palatable to an empiricist? I’ll explore this with reference to philosophic
 al naturalism\, metaphysical realism\, and the transcendence of the Self.\n
 \n*Lecture 1*\n\nPhilosophical naturalism\, from the 1944 School of Natural
 ism of Columbia University to Quine and Maddy\, proclaims itself as a stanc
 e rather than a thesis or dogma. What precisely characterizes that stance\,
  how does it differ from empiricism or realism? While naturalism comes in m
 any shapes and flavors\, it tends to imply a starting point for philosophic
 al analysis that may subtly sabotage the analysis itself. My focus here wil
 l be entirely on naturalism in epistemology and philosophy of science\, wit
 h metaphysics left aside.\n\nKim\, Jaegwon “The American Origins of Philoso
 phical Naturalism” pp. 83-98 in Robert Audi (Ed.) *Philosophy In America At
  The Turn Of The Century. APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosoph
 ical Research* 28 (2003)\n\nMaddy\, Penelope “Naturalism: Friends and Foes”
 . *Philosophical Perspectives* 15 (2001): 37-67.\n\nvan Fraassen\, Bas C. "
 Against Naturalized Empiricism"\, pp. 68-88 in P. Leonardi and M. Santambro
 gio (eds.) *On Quine*. Cambridge Univ. Press\, 1995\; available at\n<http:/
 /www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/Against-SANMARIN.pdf>
SUMMARY:Townsend Visitor\nBas C. van Fraassen\nAgainst Naturalism: a Partin
 g of the Ways in Philosophy
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