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LOCATION:234 Moses Hall
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DTEND:20090318T200000
DTSTART:20090318T180000
UID:philosophy.berkeley.edu:events:511
DTSTAMP:20091124T030505
DESCRIPTION:Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy\
 , and two views\, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-histor
 ical view of reference\, have dominated the field. In this research traditi
 on\, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions abou
 t the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. Particularly\, in Nami
 ng and Necessity\, Kripke developed some well-known thought-experiments tha
 t were widely taken to undermine descriptivist theories of reference. But w
 hat if the intuitions elicited by Kripke's thought-experiments were not uni
 versal? What would be the implications for theories of reference if these i
 ntuitions varied across cultures? Machery et al. (2004) presented some evid
 ence that Westerners and East Asians tend in fact to have different intuiti
 ons about reference\, and they argued that these findings had puzzling phil
 osophical implications. After a brief review of this early work\, I will ex
 amine some recent objections by Devitt\, Marti\, Deutsch\, and Ludwig and I
  will describe some additional research done in response to these objection
 s.
SUMMARY:Working Group in HPLMS\nEdouard Machery\nExperimental semantics (or
  what would Kripke have said if he were Asian?)
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