Mon Dec 9, 2013
Howison Library, 4:10–6 PM
|Graduate Research Colloquium
Erin Beeghly (UC-Berkeley)
What’s wrong with stereotyping?
It is tempting to think that stereotyping is wrong because it involves failing to treat persons as individuals . Yet this idea is puzzling. What is wrong about failing to treat persons an individuals? One possibility, to which many people are drawn, is that the wrong can be articulated in epistemic terms: we see the world in an incorrect way when we stereotype. Call this the epistemic objection to stereotyping. In this talk, I consider two forms that the epistemic objection can take. Rejecting each one, I’ll argue that the wrong of stereotyping is not epistemic in nature. I also arrive at a better understanding of what stereotyping is and why it is sometimes valuable. In conclusion, I’ll speculate about what a better explanation of why stereotyping is wrong would look like.